ICMF Methodology

ICMF defines a structured methodology for evaluating suspicious code patterns in enterprise systems. The methodology is designed to minimize false positives while ensuring high-confidence findings carry sufficient evidentiary weight for audit and investigative use.


Methodology Goals

  • Reduce false positives through mandatory evidence gates
  • Standardize manipulation detection across analysts and tools
  • Improve analyst consistency for cross-team investigations
  • Clearly distinguish weak signals from actionable evidence
  • Produce findings usable by both security engineers and business stakeholders

Analysis Flow

Step 1 — Identify Suspicious Code Pattern

Detect a code pattern that matches a known ICMF signal category:

  • Financial field write with unexpected mathematical operation
  • Conditional branch bypassing authorization checks
  • Logging suppression or audit record modification
  • Bulk data access or unexpected external write
  • Cross-module distribution of related changes

Exit criteria: A specific code construct is identified and recorded with file path, line numbers, and the triggering signal.


Step 2 — Evaluate Execution Context

Decision: Is this code in a production execution path?

Context Action
Production business logic Continue to Step 3
Test / mock / fixture Reduce confidence — do not escalate to High or Critical
Migration / seed script Reduce confidence — flag as informational
DTO / model-only (no logic) Apply Object Type Guard — exit
Configuration / enum / manifest Apply Declarative Guard — exit

Object Type Guard: If the containing type is a PermissionSet, Enum, Interface, Configuration class, or pure data container with no business logic, the finding is excluded from financial and authorization manipulation classifications regardless of field names.

Declarative Guard: If the suspicious pattern exists only as a value assignment in a configuration or mapping context — not as a runtime calculation — the finding is excluded.


Step 3 — Apply Domain Claim Guard

Decision: Does direct field evidence exist?

For financial manipulation claims:

  • Is there a direct write to a recognized financial field? (amount, balance, price, salary, fee, commission, tax, discount, bonus, total, subtotal)
  • Does the write occur in a financial transaction flow? (payment, invoice, ledger, posting, payroll, settlement, clearing)

For authorization manipulation claims:

  • Is there a conditional branch that returns authorized/approved without executing the normal check?
  • Is there a hardcoded identity or credential that short-circuits the authorization path?

If no direct field evidence → maximum severity is Medium. Do not assign High or Critical.


Step 4 — Assess Evidence Strength

Map the finding to an ICMF Evidence Level:

Level Name Criteria Max Severity
0 Heuristic Signal Naming only, no logic evidence Informational
1 Structural Indicator Suspicious structure, context unclear Low–Medium
2 Contextual Evidence Pattern + business context confirms plausibility Medium–High
3 Direct Manipulation Evidence Runtime write/bypass clearly observable High–Critical
4 Confirmed Exploitable Pattern Multi-signal, cross-file, same actor Critical

Key questions for this step:

  1. Is the manipulation reachable in production without additional conditions?
  2. Is the same pattern corroborated in multiple files or modules?
  3. Does the commit history show this change was introduced by a single actor in a short window?
  4. Does the change suppress or bypass audit logging in the same or adjacent commit?

Step 5 — Classify ICMF Technique

Map the confirmed finding to a specific ICMF technique from the technique index.

If multiple techniques apply, classify all applicable techniques. Note whether cross-technique correlation increases the overall confidence score (see confidence bonuses below).

Confidence bonuses:

Bonus Signal Effect
Cross-file correlation (same pattern, related files) +1 Evidence Level
Actor attribution (same commit author, financial + auth bypass) +1 Evidence Level
Temporal clustering (related changes within 30-day commit window) +0.5 Evidence Level
Audit suppression co-occurrence with financial pattern +1 Evidence Level

Step 6 — Assign Risk Level

Evidence Level Risk Level Definition
4 Critical Direct evidence + exploitability + high impact confirmed
3 High Strong manipulation evidence with meaningful business impact
2 Medium Suspicious but incomplete evidence; plausible manipulation
1 Low Weak indicator or design-level risk
0 Informational Contextual observation only; no actionable evidence

Step 7 — Require Analyst Review for Severe Claims

Before publishing or acting on a Critical or High finding:

Checklist:

  • [ ] Direct code evidence documented with file path and line numbers
  • [ ] Evidence Level confirmed at Level 3 or 4
  • [ ] Domain Claim Guard passed (direct field write or bypass confirmed)
  • [ ] Object Type and Declarative Guards passed (not a config or enum)
  • [ ] No test/mock context present
  • [ ] Second analyst has reviewed the finding
  • [ ] Developer explanation has been considered or requested

If any checkbox fails → downgrade to Medium and flag for follow-up.


False Positive Controls

ICMF explicitly avoids the following:

Anti-Pattern Control
Domain claims based only on class or table names Domain Claim Guard (Step 3)
Runtime abuse claims for declarative objects Object Type Guard (Step 2)
Critical findings without technical proof Analyst Review Checklist (Step 7)
Escalation of test code Execution Context Gate (Step 2)
Single-signal Critical findings Evidence Level ceiling (Step 6)

Severity Definitions (Summary)

Level Definition
Critical Direct, confirmed, exploitable manipulation with high business impact
High Strong manipulation evidence with meaningful but not fully confirmed impact
Medium Suspicious pattern with plausible but incomplete evidence
Low Weak indicator or design-level risk without clear exploit path
Informational Observation only — no current evidence of manipulation